




ASSURANCE, DISSUASSION, AND DETERRENCE (ADD) IN THE POST- COLD WAR, POST-9/11 ERA

Elaine Bunn and Richard Mies

31 January 2008

COLD WAR DETERRENCE WAS MORE COMPLEX AND NUANCED THAN FREQUENTLY DEPICTED



CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS

PROLIFERATION OF WMD



BAKER/CUTLER,
JEREMIAH, COX,
DEUTCH REPORTS

RISE OF TERRORISM




INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS

PROLIFERATION OF CRUISE AND
BALLISTIC MISSILES



RUMSFELD
REPORT

NEW WAYS OF MANAGING
NUCLEAR FORCES



CREATION OF STOCKPILE
STEWARDSHIP AND DTRA

IMPORTANCE OF
SUSTAINING DETERRENCE




DSB REPORT

NEW
REALITY


- More Diverse, Less Predictable Threats
- Need to Shape Strategic Forces for 21st Century
- Must Evolve Strategic Thinking Beyond Deterrence

DETERRENCE RELATIONSHIPS IN A MULTI-POLAR WORLD




THE NEW TRIAD

Existing Triad



New Triad

Non-nuclear and Nuclear Strike Capabilities



QDR/NPR FOUR DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

- **Assure allies and friends by demonstrating the US' steadiness of purpose and capability to fulfill its military commitments**
- **Dissuade potential adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of allies and friends**
- **Deter threats and counter coercion against the US, its forces, allies, and friends**
- **Defeat any adversary decisively and defend against attack if deterrence fails**

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW CONCEPTUAL ADDD PARADIGM

DISCOURAGE ALLIED
PROLIFERATION

DISCOURAGE
COMPETITION
SECOND TO NONE

ASSURANCE


DISSUASION

DETERRENCE


DEFENSE/DEFEAT

THREAT OF
RETALIATION/DENIAL

CONTINGENCY
WARGAMES



ADD DEPENDS UPON ALL INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER



FUNCTIONING IN A COMPLEMENTARY AND INTERDEPENDENT WAY

EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT

■ NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE FORCES



DISSUASION/
ASSURANCE/
COMPELLENCE

DETERRENCE-
DENIAL/
DEFENSE

DETERRENCE-
RETALIATION

COLD WAR

POST-COLD WAR



- POSITIVE / NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES
- ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
- CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
- THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVES




- ACTIVE/PASSIVE DEFENSES
- ROBUST INFRASTRUCTURE
- STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES



THE REALITY: IS ADDD REALLY addD?

DISCOURAGE ALLIED
PROLIFERATION

DISCOURAGE
COMPETITION
SECOND TO NONE



THREAT OF
RETALIATION/DENIAL

CONTINGENCY
WARGAMES

TAILORING ADD COMMUNICATION STRATEGY


- “Tailored deterrence” – new label for old concept
 - Post 9/11: adapt ADD for major powers, rogue states and terrorists in many contexts
 - Need to really understand *each of the actors* U.S. is trying to assure, dissuade and deter
- U.S. sends messages by its *words and actions* and is communicating to multiple international actors and its own public
 - Can’t credibly threaten actions that won’t be supported domestically
- Must “tailor” communication strategy to ensure effective ADD

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **New Administration should resist impulse to change just for sake of change**
 - Retain ADD conceptual framework as it has evolved and continue to mature/refine concepts
- **Effective ADD requires integration of all elements of national power**
 - NSC take the lead in ADD analysis, planning and policy formulation
- **U.S. nuclear deterrence still critical**
 - Needs senior-level attention and engagement of Congress to build a sustainable consensus on U.S. 21st century nuclear strategy, policy and posture
- **U.S. badly needs a communication strategy of ADD**
 - Need NSC-led process for assessing and adapting ADD messages

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

A PARADIGM SHIFT?




“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its principal purpose must be to avert them”
Bernard Brodie (1946)¹

DISCUSSION



BACKUP SLIDES

THE JOURNEY TO STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS AND A NEW TRIAD




NUCLEAR PYRAMID

Addressed in arms control indirectly via launcher accounting rules



ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORKS NEED TO BE MORE COMPREHENSIVE


THE STRATEGIC TARGETING DOCTRINE DILEMMA



Factors for U.S. to Consider in START Reductions

<u>Drivers</u>	<u>Deployed U.S. forces</u>	<u>Strategic concerns/consequences</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deter a Superpower with a massive arsenal (Soviet Union). 	~10,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stable extended deterrence. Other adversaries treated as "lesser included" cases.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deter a Superpower with declining target base (Russia). 	3,000 to 3,500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extended deterrence preserved. Regime stable against some undetected cheating. Strategic reserve force must serve multiple needs.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deter/dissuade regional powers with nuclear weapons or other WMD. 	? few thousands ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CURRENT TARGETING STRATEGY INCREASINGLY LESS VIABLE. Risks due to cheating more important. Risks arise from reliability failures, with fewer recovery options. Can no longer ignore disparity in "non-strategic" weapons. More emphasis on invulnerable forces. Must take into account all adversaries' forces, and correlate forces with nuclear allies. Must shore up extended deterrence or risk proliferation by allies as well.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transition from military deterrence. Deter through "city busting" strategy. 	? few hundreds ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EXTENDED DETERRENCE ERODING. Deterrence of conflicts/wars becomes more problematical. Increasing proliferation pressures from allies and adversaries. No confidence in verification (e.g., all fissile material).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existential deterrence Nuclear abolition 	? few tens ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nuclear deterrence (at these levels) unlikely to prevent conventional conflicts/wars from starting. No extended deterrence, i.e. "fortress America." Small wars more likely to escalate into large wars. No guarantees against reversals.

THE TARGETING DILEMMA OF MINIMAL DETERRENCE



THE UNDERLYING DEBATE (IN THE LANGUAGE OF DARWIN)

“Extinction”

- Numbers equivalent to nuclear danger.
- Steady progress toward minimalism or abolition.
- Nuclear weapons only have political utility - existential deterrence.
- Resumption of testing would encourage proliferation.
- Existing arsenal adequate. Improvements increase likelihood of use.
- Constraints promote stability.

“Adaptation”

- Focus on stability/capabilities vice numbers.
- Zero leads to instability; small numbers pose ethical/moral dilemma.
- Nuclear weapons must have military utility to be credible - avoid self-deterrence.
- Resumption of testing may be required to maintain credibility. Proliferation relatively independent of testing.
- Adaptation of arsenal essential to deter emerging threats.
- Strategic flexibility required to deal with uncertainty.

